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Abstract: High-skill immigrants form networks that facilitate subsequent low-skill
immigration. To minimize the effects of low-skill immigration on unemployment, a strict
lean-against-the-wind strategy or a flexible lean-against-the-wind strategy that is
supported by, and takes into account the effect of, border control, are considered. None of
these policies is necessarily better than the other as regards leniency toward low-skill
immigration as well as the number of illegal immigrants. High-skill immigration
increases illegal immigration when the effect of migrant networks on the supply of lowskill immigrants is greater than the job-creation effect of these networks.
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I Introduction
The recent literature on immigration has emphasized the “family and friends effect”
as one of the main factors explaining migration (e.g., Stark and Wang, 2002). That is, the
first wave of migrants forms a network that provides information and support for
prospective migrants. Lucas (1997) points out that these migrant networks are related to
high-skill veteran immigrants providing support to low-skill relatives and friends to
follow their steps. The support provided by earlier migrants can take different forms:
economic, cultural and emotional.
Immigration policies generally take the form of quotas. Immigration quotas exist due
to excess supply of immigrants. The excess supply of immigrants is the source of illegal
immigration. Therefore it is natural to inquire what are, if any, the relationship among
immigrant policy quotas, illegal immigration and migrant networks.
This paper deals with this issue within a framework of supply of and demand for
immigrants in which there are two types of immigrants, high-skill and low-skill workers.
The immigration can be either legal or illegal. In line with recent literature, migrant
networks facilitate the provision of support by earlier, high-skill immigrants, to low-skill
immigrants. In the spirit of Hicks (1932) we assume that high-skill immigration is
triggered by positive income differential between the country of destination and the
country of origin. Although high-skill immigrants may be perceived to be the “scouts”
who pave the immigration path for their less-skilful relatives and friends, we assume that
their immigration is not restricted due to large excess demand for their types of skills in
the host country. In contrast, we assume that low-skill immigrants face immigration
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quotas, and the excess supply of low-skill immigrants feeds the number of illegal
immigrants1.
The flow of immigrants increases the supply of workers, which affects the
unemployment rate in the host country. As a consequence, the government may set an
immigration quota policy aiming at minimizing a loss function that depends on the
unemployment rate. We analyze two different immigration quota policies – a strict lean
against the wind and a flexible lean against the wind that takes into account the
moderating effect of border enforcement on illegal immigration - and investigate which is
the most efficient in increasing the number of legal immigrants and/or reducing the
number of illegal immigrants. We find that there is no clear reason to expect that any of
the policies is more efficient than the other. The choice between the policies on these
criteria critically depends on factors such as the probability of success in entering
illegally the destination-country, the excess supply of low-skill immigrants, the
relationship among immigration quota, border-control investments, job creation and
illegal immigration.
In addition, we analyze the role of immigration networks in affecting the number of
low-skill and illegal immigrants. Of key importance is the identification of the support
provided by high-skill immigrants to low-skill immigrants. In particular, we assume two
types of “family and friends” effects. The first increases the demand for low-skill
immigrants through the arrangement and creation of jobs for the low-skilled immigrants
by their relatives and friends, high-skill, earlier immigrants (see Meng, 2000). The second
effect increases the supply of low-skill immigrants through positive financial transfers
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As in Ethier (1986) we ignore the illegal immigration of skilled workers, since most countries are willing
to admit such immigrants.
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made by earlier high-skill immigrants in favor of their low-skill relatives and friends in
the country of origin so as to reduce the costs of, and induce, their immigration. When the
effect of the immigration networks on the supply of low-skill immigrants dominates their
effect on the demand for low-skill immigrants, the current number of illegal immigrants
increases with the number of earlier high-skill immigrants.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II modifies Levy’s (2002) supply of and
demand for immigrant by introducing high-skill and low-skill immigrants, restricting the
entry of low-skill immigrants by a strict lean-against-the-wind policy, and incorporating
the effectiveness of border control into the strict lean-against-the-wind policy to form a
flexible lean-against-the-wind policy. Section III derives the expected-employment-lossminimizing feedback coefficients and presents the conditions for leaning against the wind
of low-skill immigration. Section IV derives the maximum quota and presents the
demand for low-skill immigrants under strict and flexible leaning against the wind.
Section V presents the condition under which the flexible strategy is more lenient than
the strict strategy. Section VI analyzes the number of illegal immigrants resulting from
the excess supply of low-skill immigrants and presents the condition under which the
flexible strategy leads to a smaller number of illegal immigrants than the strict strategy.
This section also shows that it is possible that none of these strategies is superior to the
other as regards leniency and least number of illegal immigrants simultaneously. Section
VII discusses the role of migrant networks and analyzes the impact of earlier high-skill
immigration on current legal and illegal low-skill immigration. Section VIII concludes.

3

II Supply and demand determinants of low-skill immigrants
We assume that the immigration of low-skill people is facilitated by capable
“family-and-friends” in the host country and hence take the current supply of low-skill
immigrants ( Lst ) to be positively related to the number of high-skill veteran immigrants
( H t −1 ):
Lst = R( H t −1 ), R ' > 0 .

(1)

We assume that there is an excess demand for high-skill workers and hence there
are no restrictions on high-skill immigration. In contrast, and similar to Ethier (1986), we
assume that the market of low-skill labor has a rigid wage, presumably at a level above
the market-clearing one, generating unemployment. Thus, the admittance of low-skill
immigrants might aggravate the host-country’s unemployment problem2. The current
change in host-country’s unemployment level (U) is given by:
U t = Lt − J t + Vt

(2)

where Lt is the number of low-skill immigrants who legally entered the host country at t,
J t is the number of vacant jobs at t, and Vt is the number of illegal immigrants who
successfully entered the host country at t.
We assume that the host-country’s government is aware of the adverse effect of
low-skill immigration on the domestic level of employment as presented in equation (2)
and postulate that the government sets the number of low-skill immigrants to be admitted
so as to minimize the expected loss from an increase in unemployment above a desired

2

Agiomirgianakis and Zervoyianni (2001) focus on the impact of illegal immigration on social welfare.
They show that illegal immigration reduces the inflationary bias associated with expansionary policies and
thus has a positive overall impact on `social welfare' in the economy.
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level. For tractability, the loss function (Ä) is taken to be quadratic and the desired
increase in the unemployment level to be zero:
Ä = E[U t ] 2 .

(3)

In setting the expected-loss-minimizing quota of low-skill immigrants, two
alternative Lean Against the Wind (LAW) rules are considered. The first is a Strict LAW
(S-LAW, hereafter):
Lt = g 0 − g1 Lt −1 ≥ 0

(4)

where g 0 is the maximum quota of low-skill immigrants per period, g1 is a feedback
coefficient reflecting the intensity of the policy-maker’s reaction to the number of lowskill immigrants admitted in the previous period and thereby divergence from the
maximum quota.
The second is a Flexible LAW (F-LAW, hereafter). That is, a LAW alleviated by
the moderating effect of border enforcement (B) on illegal immigration3. Here, the
effectiveness of recent past border enforcement positively affects the current quota of
low-skill immigrants:
Lt = G0 − G1 [ Lt −1 − Bt −1 ] ≥ 0

(5)

where G 0 indicates the maximum periodical number of immigrants admitted, Bt −1 is the
number of illegal immigrants apprehended and detained in the previous period, and G1 is
a feedback coefficient.

3

See Karlson and Katz (2003) for a policy mix involving border control.
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III Feedback-coefficients and the conditions for leaning against the wind
The parameters of the S-LAW and F-LAW are found by minimizing the quadratic
expected loss function, which is equivalent to minimizing the stationary variance of the
unemployment level. By considering equations (4) and (2)
g1∗ = arg min{g12 var( L) + var( J ) + var(V )
− 2 g1[cov(Lt −1 , Vt ) − cov( Lt −1 , J t ) + cov(Vt , J t ) ]}

(6)

and by considering equations (5) and (2)
G1∗ = arg min{G12 [ var(L ) + var( B)] + var( J ) + var(V )
− 2G1[cov( Lt −1 , Vt ) − cov( Lt −1 , J t ) + cov(Vt , J t ) + cov( Bt −1 , J t ) − cov( Bt −1 ,Vt )]}
(7)

Since var( L) > 0 and var( B) > 0 the second-order condition for minimum is satisfied in
both cases and the expected-loss-minimizing feedback coefficients of S-LAW and FLAW are given, respectively, by
g 1* =

cov( Lt −1 , Vt ) − cov( Lt −1 , J t )
var( L )

(8)

G1* =

cov( Lt −1 ,Vt ) − cov( Lt −1 , J t ) + cov( Bt −1 , J t ) − cov( Bt −1 ,Vt )
.
var(L) + var( B)

(9)

Equations (8) and (9) reveal that the feasibility of both the S-LAW and the FLAW in regulating the number of low-skill immigrants depends crucially on the
existence of differences between the stationary covariances. In the case of S-LAW, the
feedback-coefficient g1* depends on a difference between the stationary covariances of
the lagged number of legal low-skill immigrants with the current numbers of vacant jobs
and illegal immigrants. It is reasonable to assume that the more restrictive the
immigration quota in the past, the greater the number of vacant jobs in the host country in
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the present, that is, negative correlation between Lt −1 and J t . In the same vein, the more
restrictive the immigration quota in the past, the larger the illegal immigration in the
present, that is, negative correlation between Lt −1 and Vt . Leaning against the wind is
feasible if g1* > 0 , which in turn requires that

cov( Lt −1 , J t ) > cov( Lt −1 ,Vt ) or

equivalently cor ( Lt −1 , J t ) sd ( J ) > cor ( Lt −1 , Vt ) sd (V ) .
In the case of F-LAW, it is sensible to assume that the larger the investment in
border enforcement in the past, the lower the illegal immigration in the present; that is, a
negative correlation between Bt −1 and Vt . We assume that there is no correlation
between investment in border enforcement in the past Bt −1 and the present number of
vacant jobs, J t . Again, leaning against the wind is feasible if G1* > 0 . This, in turn,
requires that cov( Lt −1 , J t ) + cov(Bt −1 , Vt ) > cov(Lt −1 , Vt ) .

IV Maximum quota and the demand for low-skill immigrants
The expected-loss-minimizing maximum quota of low-skill immigrants under SLAW ( g 0* ) and under F-LAW ( G0* ) are found by computing the stationary expectation of
U from equation (2) and setting it to be equal to the desired increase in the level of
unemployment, which was assumed to be equal to zero:
g 0* = g1* E ( L) + E ( J )− E (V )

(10)

G0* = G1* [ E ( L) − E ( B )] + E ( J ) − E (V ) .

(11)
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Using equations (4), (8) and (10) and assuming that low-skill immigrants admitted
in earlier periods cannot be dumped, the derived demand for low-skill immigrants under
S-LAW is
 cov(Lt −1 , Vt ) − cov(Lt −1 , J t ) 
LdSt = E ( J )− E (V ) − 
[ Lt −1 − E ( L)]
var( L)



(12)

or zero when the right-hand side of equation (12) is negative. That is, if the host country
adopts the S-LAW policy, its demand for low-skill immigrants is equal to the greater
number between zero and the expected number of vacant jobs minus the expected
number of illegal immigrants and the product of the feedback-coefficient and the
deviation of the number of immigrants admitted in the previous period from the
stationary number.
Similarly, equations (5), (9) and (11) imply that the derived-demand equation for
low-skill immigrants under F-LAW is:
LdFt = E ( J )− E (V )
(13)
 cov(Lt −1 , Vt ) − cov(Lt −1 , J t ) − cov( Bt −1 ,Vt ) 
−
[ Lt −1 − E ( L) + Bt −1 − E ( B)]
var( L) + var( B )



or zero if the right-hand side of equation (13) is negative. When F-LAW is adopted, the
demand for legal low-skill immigrants is equal to the expected number of vacant jobs
minus the expected number of illegal immigrants and the product of the optimal feedback
coefficient and the deviation of the number of low-skill immigrants admitted in the
previous period from the stationary number and the deviation of the border-control
performance in the previous period from its stationary level.
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In the next two sections we investigate whether the F-LAW strategy is better than
the S-LAW strategy as regards leniency toward low-skill immigration and as regards the
number of illegal immigrants.

V Is the F-LAW more lenient than the S-LAW toward low-skill immigration?
An immigration policy is said to be more lenient than another if it admits a larger
number of low-skill immigrants than the other. From liberal, egalitarian and global
perspectives an immigration policy reflecting a high degree of leniency is preferred to
that reflecting a lower degree. In that sense, leniency may be considered as a criterion for
choosing between immigration policies.

Proposition 1: If G1* [ Bt −1 − E ( B)] ≤ [ g1* − G1* ][ Lt −1 − E ( L) ] , then the F-LAW is more
lenient than the S-LAW.

Proposition 1 suggests that despite of its inherent moderation of the quotaadjustment of low-skill immigration by the border-control’s performance in limiting
illegal, low-skill immigrants, the F-LAW policy on low-skill immigration is not
necessarily more lenient than the S-LAW policy. This is due to the fact that the inequality
G1* [ Bt −1 − E ( B)] ≤ [ g1* − G1* ][ Lt −1 − E ( L) ] depends on a variety of conditions. For
instance, if

[ Bt −1 − E ( B)] > 0 and [ Lt −1 − E ( L) ] > 0 , then three separate inequalities

should be simultaneously satisfied for the inequality indicated in the proposition to hold:
i) [ g1* − G1* ] > 0 ; ii) G1* ≤ [ g1* − G1* ] , and iii) [ Bt −1 − E ( B )] ≤ [ Lt −1 − E ( L) ] . In view of
these conditions and the conditions associated in other scenarios, it is safe to say that
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there is no clear reason to expect the F-LAW to be more lenient than the S-LAW toward
low-skill immigration.

VI Does the F-LAW lead to a smaller illegal immigration than the S-LAW?

Illegal immigration reflects, in the context of the proposed model, the excess supply
of low-skill immigrants. The supply of low-skill immigrants is given by equation (1) and
the demand for low-skill migrants varies in accordance with the destination-country’s
low-skill immigration policy.
When the S-LAW policy on low-skill immigration is pursued the number of illegal
immigrants is given by
VSt =θ [ R ( H t −1 ) − LdSt ]

(14)

where θ is the probability of being successful in entering the destination-country, which
in the absence of investment in border enforcement is high.
When the F-LAW policy on low-skill immigration is adopted, the number of
illegal immigrants is given by
VFt = λ [ R( H t −1 ) − LdFt ]

(15)

where λ is the probability of being successful in entering the destination-country. As it is
harder to enter in the destination-country when the government invests in border control,
λ <θ .
A possible criterion for a destination-country for preferring one policy to the other
is the least number of illegal immigrants, who are, in the context of our model, also
endowed with low skills.
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Proposition 2: The F-LAW policy leads to a smaller number of illegal immigrants than
d
θ [ R( H t −1 ) − LSt ]
the S-LAW policy if >
.
λ [ R( H t −1 ) − LdFt ]

Proposition 2 states that only if the ratio of the probability of entering illegally the
destination-country under the S-LAW to that under the F-LAW (which is greater than
one) exceeds the ratio of the excess supply of low-skill immigrants under the S-LAW to
that under the F-LAW (which by Proposition 1 may or may not be greater than one), the
F-LAW policy on low-skill immigration leads to a smaller number of illegal immigrants
than the S-LAW rule.
It is interesting to note that even when the condition indicated in Proposition 1 is
satisfied and the number of legal low-skill immigrants under the border-enforcement
augmented F-LAW rule is larger than that under the S-LAW rule, the implementation of
the former, which includes investment in border enforcement, may not necessarily
generates a smaller number of illegal immigrants than the implementation of the latter,
which does not includes investment in border enforcement. The probabilities of being a
successful illegal immigrant under either policy have to be taken into account and their
ratio has to be contrasted with the ratio of excess supply of low-skill immigrants, as
stated in proposition 2.
Furthermore, leniency, as defined in the previous section, may be perceived as
desirable aspect of an immigration policy, at least from liberal, egalitarian and global
perspectives. Yet the aforementioned sort of independency between proposition 1 and
proposition 2 leads us to conclude that there is not necessarily a consensus between the
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leniency-criterion and the least-number-of-illegal-immigrants criterion in favor of the FLAW rule or the S-LAW rule. Hence, we cannot claim that any of the investigated lowskill-immigration-quota policy is conclusively superior to the other as regards these two
criterions simultaneously. The choice between the policies depends on factors such as the
probability of success in entering illegally the host country, the excess supply of low-skill
immigrants, and the relationship among immigration quota, border control investments,
job creation and illegal immigration.

VII The role of migrant networks
A related important issue is to identify the role of migrant networks in low- skill
migration. It was argued in the introduction that high-skill immigrants play the role of
earlier immigrants and form networks that support low-skill workers to immigrate. Here
Two types of support are examined in this section. The first one is the direct help in
covering migration costs. This type of help increases the supply of low skill immigrants
as stated in equation (1).
The second type of support is job creation. We assume that the number of jobs
created for current low-skill immigrants increase with the number of earlier immigration
of high skill workers. That is, J t = J ( H t −1), J ' > 0 . In terms of the demand for current
low-skill immigrants under any of the LAW rules, depicted by equations (12) and (13),
the expected value of the job created increases with the number of early high-skill
migrants: namely,

dE[ J ( H t −1)]
> 0 . Therefore, the impact of recent-past immigration of
dH t −1

high skill workers on the current number of legal low-skill immigrants is positive and the
same under each of the LAW immigration rules:
12

dLdSt
dLdFt
dE[ J ( H t −1)]
=
=
>0
dH t −1 dH t −1
dH t −1

(16)

Equation (16) states that the demand for legal low-skill immigrants increases with the
size of the past-period number of high-skill immigrants due to the effect of immigration
networks in job creation.
It is also possible to assess the impact of high-skill immigration on the number of
illegal immigrants. When the government implements the S-LAW low-skill immigration
policy,

 dR( H t −1) dE[ J ( H t −1)] 
dVSt
dR( H t −1) dE[ J ( H t −1)]
=θ 
−
>
. That is,
 > 0 if
dH t −1
dH t −1 
dH t −1
dH t −1
 dH t −1

the current number of illegal immigrants rises with the past-period number of high-skill
immigrants if the impact of the migrant networks on the supply of low-skill immigrants is
greater than their effect on job creation. When the border-enforcement augmented FLAW

low-skill

immigration

policy

is

adopted,

 dR( H t −1) dE[ J ( H t −1)] 
dR( H t −1) dE[ J ( H t −1)]
dVFt
>
and, as in the
=λ
−
 > 0 if
dH t −1
dH t −1
dH t −1
dH t −1 
 dH t −1
case of the S-LAW, the current number of illegal immigrants rises with the past-period
number of high-skill immigrants if the impact of the migrant networks on the supply of
low-skill immigrants is greater than their effect on job creation. Thus, it is essential to
assess the impact of migrant networks on the supply of and the demand for low-skill
immigrants for explaining the impact of high-skill immigration on illegal immigration.
When the effect of migrant networks in pushing the supply of immigrants, through direct
financial help to prospective low-skill immigrants, is greater than their effect on the
demand for low-skill immigrants through job creation, the number of illegal immigrants
is bound to rise.
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VIII Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes the relationship among immigration policy quotas, illegal
immigrants and migrant networks. Immigrants are classified as high-skill and low-skill
workers. High-skill immigration precedes and facilitates low-skill immigration. Migrant
networks are related to the support given by high-skill immigrants to low-skill
immigrants. High-skill immigration is free of barriers on entry, whereas low-skill
immigration is subjected to quotas. The excess supply of low-skill immigrants generates
illegal immigration.
The host country’s government sets an immigration quota policy in order to
minimize the effects of low-skill immigration on unemployment. Two policies were
examined: a strict lean against the wind and a flexible one, which incorporates the
government’s investment in border control. Two criterions for identifying the best policy
were considered. Under the first criterion, an immigration policy is said to be better than
the other if it admits a greater number of low-skill immigrants, whereas under the second
criterion, if it leads to a smaller number of illegal immigrants. It was found that these
criteria do not necessarily agree that any of the lean-against-the-wind immigration policy
is better than the other. The choice between the policies depends on factors such as the
probability of success in entering illegally the host country, the excess supply of low-skill
immigrants, and the relationship among immigration quota, border control investments,
job creation and illegal immigration.
In addition, we analyze the impact of high-skill immigration on the number of
legal and illegal low-skill immigrants. Due to the contribution of migrant networks to job
creation the demand for legal low-skill immigrants increases when the past period
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number of high-skill immigrants rises. We find that when the effect of migration
networks in expanding the supply of immigrants, through direct financial help to
prospective low-skill immigrants, dominates the job-creation effect, the current number
of illegal immigrants increased by past high-skill immigration.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1: G1* [ Bt −1 − E ( B )] ≤ [ g 1* − G1* ][ Lt −1 − E ( L) ] ⇒
[G1* − g 1* ][ Lt −1 − E ( L) ] + G1* [ Bt −1 − E ( B)] ≤ 0 ⇒
− G1* [ Lt −1 − E ( L) + Bt −1 − E ( B)] ≥ − g1* [ Lt −1 − E ( L) ] ⇒ LdFt ≥ LdSt . QED
Proof

of

Proposition

2:

Recalling

equations

(14)

and

(15),

θ [ R( H t −1 ) − LdSt ]
>
⇒ θ [ R( H t −1 ) − LdSt ] > λ [ R( H t −1 ) − LdFt ] ⇒ VSt > V Ft . QED
d
λ [ R( H t −1 ) − LFt ]

17

